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Abstract
Mobile crowdsensing is a people-centric sensing system based on users’ contri-
butions and incentive mechanisms aim at stimulating them. In our work, we
have rethought the design of incentive mechanisms through a game-theoretic
methodology. Thus, we have introduced a multi-layer social sensing framework,
where humans as social sensors interact on multiple social layers and various
services. We have proposed to weigh these dynamic interactions by including
the concept of homophily, that is a human-related factor related to the similarity
and frequency of interactions on the multiplex network. We have modeled the
evolutionary dynamics of sensing behaviours by defining a mathematical frame-
work based on multiplex EGT, quantifying the impact of homophily, network
heterogeneity and various social dilemmas. We have detected the configura-
tions of social dilemmas and network structures that lead to the emergence and
sustainability of human cooperation. Moreover, we have defined and evaluated
local and global Nash equilibrium points by including the concepts of homophily
and heterogeneity. Therefore, we have analytically defined and measured novel
statistical measures of QoI and user reputation scores based on the evolutionary
dynamics. Measures are distinct for the different configurations and higher for
the most cooperative ones. Through the proposed methodology we have defined
the core of a DSS for designing novel incentive mechanisms by operating on the
policies in terms of QoI and user reputation scores.
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1. Introduction
Recently, we have been witnessing with a widespread diffusion and adoption
of mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, becoming essential in our
daily lives [1, 2, 3, 4]. In addition, the integration of more and more embedded
sensors (GPS, gyroscope, camera, etc.) into these devices, along with improved
processing power and storage capacities, have enhanced their sensing capabil-
ities [2, 4]. In parallel, the growth of mobile networks and wireless communi-
cation technologies have resulted in a better connectivity among users’ devices
and vehicular systems [4]. Overall, these enhanced mobile and pervasive tech-
nologies have led to an increasing development of a wide range of applications
[1, 4] that are part of the paradigm termed as Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS).
MCS is therefore a people-centric sensing system based on human voluntary
participation or contribution about some phenomena in their surrounding envi-
ronment, namely human users with their personal mobile devices acquire local
information (e.g. geo-spatial) and share their knowledge or measures with other
users and communities in the network [3, 1, 5]. Thus, this large-scale sensing
paradigm leverages the collaborative approach of individuals contributing to
measure phenomena of mutual interest [1, 3, 6]. MCS is a clear example of the
cyber-physical convergence phenomenon, leading to the Internet of People (IoP)
paradigm, as conceptualised in [7]. Humans carrying mobile devices not only
act as participatory or “social sensors”, gathering data, but they also interact
with the physical and cyber worlds to accomplish changes. Thus, the dynam-
ics of human behaviours play a key role in better understanding the complex
behaviour of the cyber-physical-human world, putting people at the centre of
this novel IoP paradigm. However, since participating in the sensing systems
may incur costs and risks, common individuals are unwilling to participate and
feed the system with their sensed data due to the lack of sufficient incentives
or pushes towards cooperation. Consuming computational and communication
resources of the personal smart devices, or privacy-related issues concerned with
the provided location information when collecting data, are only some of these
risks/costs. It becomes therefore crucial to motivate users with incentive mecha-
nisms [3, 8, 9, 10, 1], encouraging them to provide their sensing contributions in
a timely and reliable manner. It is important to observe how both the number
(i.e., quantity) and the accuracy (i.e., quality) of reports assume a key role in
the operational reliability of a MCS application [1].
In this context, we propose a game-theoretic methodology in order to de-
fine the core of a decision support system for the design of a novel incentive
mechanism. Its definition is based on some statistical measures, that is the
Quality of Information (QoI) and the reputation scores of each user in the net-
work. These estimators are derived from the evolutionary dynamics of human
sensing behaviours on a multi-layer social sensing framework, where we quan-
tify the impact of homophily, network heterogeneity and multiplexity. Indeed,
by exploring the evolutionary dynamics of human cooperation, we detect which
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configurations of social dilemmas and network structures lead to the emergence
and resilience of cooperation in a complex network scenario. We therefore de-
fine a model which is both data-driven and model-driven. Indeed, starting from
data related to different MCS services, we can estimate the statistical measures
and define a novel incentive mechanism. On the other hand, from a model
perspective, the proposed model defines a class of models, that can be adapted
and refined according to specific rules and metrics. Furthermore, by considering
human factors and a game-theoretic approach, the proposed methodology aims
to make an MCS system increasingly efficient, resilient and adaptive.
1.1. Contributions of this Paper
Once explained the motivations behind the proposed methodology, the main
contributions of the paper are summarised below.
• We redesign the problem of incentive mechanism by introducing a novel
game-theoretic methodology. It allows us to model and quantify the evo-
lutionary dynamics of human sensing behaviours.
• We define a multi-layer social sensing framework to explore and quantify
the dynamics patterns of interactions due to multiple layers, inter-layer
coupling and communicability. We also quantify how the evolution of
cooperation hinges on the number of layers.
• We measure the joint impact of network properties and human-related
factors, such as homophily, in the evolutionary dynamics. To this aim, we
define weighted connections between nodes, where weights are defined by
taking into account both the concept of homophily and centrality measure
in the multiplex structure. We point out how these weights influence
behaviours on the multi-layer social sensing framework.
• In order to understand the role of network structural heterogeneity on the
evolution of human cooperation, we therefore explore and quantify how the
various network structures with a different degree of heterogeneity impact
on the evolutionary dynamics of users’ sensing behaviours. We detect
how and to what extent some specific network structures and games lead
to the emergence and sustainability of cooperation in a complex network
scenario.
• We analytically define novel statistical estimators related to truth-worthiness,
that is the Quality of Information (QoI) and the reputation scores of each
user in the network. These statistical measures constitute the core of De-
cision Support System (DSS) on which the design of incentive mechanisms
is based.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarizes
recent literature works on the various aspects considered in our work. Section 3
deals with the novel social game-theoretic methodology proposed in this work.
Section 4 presents the simulation analysis and results. Section 5 concludes the
paper with directions of future research.
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2. Related Work
Recent literature works have shed light on the role of network heterogene-
ity, homophily, providing also some key insights on how and when cooperation
emerges and sustain in the network considering the different social dilemmas.
In this section, we review the existing works, other than some proposed game-
theoretic models used to design socially-aware incentive mechanisms in MCS.
2.1. Multiplexity, Homophily, Heterogeneity and Social Dilemmas in the Evolu-
tion of Cooperation
Relationships between individuals and users are typically multi-relational in
nature, so that social behaviours and their dynamics can be understood only by
taking into account more than a single network of interactions between them.
For this reason, in recent years multi-layer networks [11, 12, 13] have been in-
troduced and regarded as the most suitable way to describe social networks or
transportation networks, only to cite a few examples. In multiplex networks,
social interactions occur on different contexts and social environments (e.g.,
family, friendships, colleagues, etc.) and an individuals behaviour can be differ-
ent on each layer, although it is determined from the simultaneous interactions
on all the layers of the multiplex structure [11, 14, 13, 12, 15]. In a MCS
systems, the multiplexity of social interactions of human users carrying their
devices therefore adds a further level of complexity. Indeed, other than intra-
layer relationships on each single network (or layer), we need to encompass also
the inter-layer interactions between humans and their counterpart nodes on the
other layers of the multiplex structure. Only by studying the inter-layer interac-
tions between nodes, it is possible to detect the emergent behaviours and focus
on the key features related to nodes and edges, from which these patterns are
generated [13]. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) constitutes the most com-
mon framework adopted to face with the conundrum of human cooperation and
social dilemmas are typically used as general metaphors for studying the evolu-
tion of cooperation [16, 11].Social dilemmas describe all the conflict situations
where the strategy with the highest individual fitness does not represent the
most convenient strategy in terms of social community [17]. Thus, players and
the whole society would benefit more from mutual cooperation, yielding both an
individual and total benefit higher than that of mutual defection. Even though
cooperation should not emerge under these conditions, in nature and real-world
networks we can observe how the cooperation does exist. One of the main tar-
gets of the work is to better understand which are the underlying mechanisms
in terms of network structure and human-related factors driving cooperation in
a networked scenario.
Homophily is the principle for which similarity breeds connection, namely
the tendency to associate and interact more frequently with similar people, as
extensively explained in [11, 17, 14]. In terms of evolutionary dynamics of hu-
man cooperation, in [11] authors have demonstrated how homophily plays a key
role in shaping human behaviours, by guiding and speeding up the emergence
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of cooperation between individuals. In a multi-layer network, homophily repre-
sents the degree correlation of two nodes on different layers, and it may become
a key factor in guiding social behaviours. Thus, so far the role of homophily in
the evolution of cooperation on a social multiplex network has been explored
and quantified considering only a Scale-Free (SF) network topology and a fixed
number of layers [11]. Indeed, real-world populations are heterogeneous, so
that there are some individuals (i.e., hubs in a SF network) having many more
connections than others.
Some other literature works [18, 19, 20] have unveiled how network hetero-
geneity plays a key role in the evolution of cooperation as it enhances the emer-
gence and resilience of cooperation. They have demonstrated how the sustain-
ability of cooperation is simpler to achieve in heterogeneous rather than in ho-
mogeneous populations, regardless the social dilemma considered as a metaphor
for investigating human cooperation. In the field of multiplex networks there
are a few results about the role of multiplexity and structural heterogeneity on
the evolution of cooperation [16, 21]. It is important to note that their results
have been derived in most cases by using the mean-field hypothesis and assuming
there is no correlation between the strategies used by an individual in each layer
of the multiplex [16]. Instead, in our work, we include correlation between nodes
strategies on different layers, which depends on the communicability function
and inter-layer coupling and interdependence between layers [11, 22]. Moreover,
since the layers of a multiplex structure may exhibit a different network topol-
ogy and degree of heterogeneity, in this work we explore and quantify how the
various network structures with a different structural heterogeneity impact on
the evolutionary dynamics of users’ sensing behaviours.
In [21] the authors have systematically studied the evolution of cooperation
in four social dilemmas that we also consider in the T-S plane on the multi-
plex network. They found out some features in the microscopic organisation
of strategies, that are responsible for the important differences between coop-
erative dynamics in monoplex or single-layer networks and multiplex networks.
Moreover, some works have demonstrated how the extent of multiplexity, which
hinges also on the number of layers and inter-layer coupling measure between
them affect the emergent social dynamics on the multiplex network [21, 16, 11].
Also, the role of homophily may result different according to the underlying net-
work structure of each layer and the number of layers composing the multiplex
structure. It is important to note that in their work authors have considered
that each layer is a homogeneous graph (i.e., Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER)) and they have
adopted the replicator-like rule for the nodes strategy update. Differently from
[21], we take into account various network structures (see 3.2), exhibiting a
different structural heterogeneity, and the Fermi rule as microscopic strategy
update rule (see 3.2.1). Some other authors [23] have analysed the evolutionary
dynamics of various social dilemmas, deriving Nash equilibria before under the
hypothesis of well-mixed population and then considering a ER-structured pop-
ulation. In the latter, they have distinguished between an interaction network
and an updating network, thus separating the role of layers in the multiplex
structure. In our work, we do not separate the role of layers in the multiplex
5
structure and in addition we measure the impact of network heterogeneity and
homophily (see 3.1). From literature works, it is clear how there are some un-
solved questions in the field of evolutionary dynamics of human behaviours on
a social multiplex network. Indeed, in the hypothesis of considering a struc-
tured population, where nodes interact with their neighbours on each layer of
the multiplex network and on each layer of the multi-layer sensing framework,
we will answer to the following question: what is the joint impact of network
heterogeneity, homophily and multiplexity on a structured population in terms
of evolutionary dynamics of human sensing behaviours?
2.2. Game-theoretic and Socially-aware Incentive Mechanisms
Most of the incentive mechanisms used in CS applications are aimed at stim-
ulating the degree and regularity of contributions. Overall, the factor mainly
used to decide how to disburse incentives is therefore related to “quantity” (i.e.,
degree of participation), without taking into account the “quality” of informa-
tion, that is the accuracy or truthfulness of contributions [1, 24]. As underlined
in [1], we must take into account both aspects, since false contributions may
result in publishing wrong information, dramatically influencing the service op-
eration. Thus, it becomes essential to measure the Quality of Information (QoI)
related to users’ contributions and then derive a user reputation score of each
human user in the MCS application.
Some recent works have proposed game-theoretic models and socially-aware
incentive mechanisms in MCS scenarios in order to analyse and increase the
participation level of users, also including social network effects [3, 25, 26, 27].
However, none of them has ever included multiplexity and homophily and a
game-theoretic model targeted at exploring human cooperation on a multiplex
social sensing by analysing the role of the various social dilemmas and complex
network topologies. Various approaches based on game-theoretic models have
addressed the issue of strategic participation of users in a MCS application [1,
28]. Recently, in [25] authors have proposed to consider also the social structure
information and influence between users in a socially-aware Bayesian Stackelberg
game to explore the users’ participation level. Then, they introduce a backward
induction to propose an optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service
provider. Also in other works [26, 27] it has been investigated how to exploit
the social network effects and trust to encourage users’ participation through
reciprocity, so that crowdsensing service providers obtain a greater gain. In most
of the CS incentive schemes, auctions and pricing strategies provide incentives
to mobile users to participate in crowdsensing applications and the basic idea is
to either maximize the total utility/value of the sensing platform under certain
costs/budgets constraints or minimize the total disbursement of the platform.
Nevertheless, some of the main drawbacks of the proposed game-theoretic
models are mostly related to the lack of a dynamic modeling approach, the ratio-
nality assumption of agents and they overlook the selfish or malicious nature of
human users. To deal with these issues and challenges, in the proposed modeling
approach, we propose a model for MCS which is inherently dynamic. Indeed,
we evaluate the evolutionary dynamics of human sensing behaviours through
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the rounds of iterated social dilemmas following a microscopic strategy update
rule based on a Fermi statistical distribution (see subsection 3.2.1). Thus, the
evolutionary game-theoretic approach does not require players/human users to
act rationally, but they only choose a strategy at each round of the game trying
to maximize their payoff [11]. In the next section we will describe the proposed
social game-theoretic model.
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Figure 1: Social Sensing and Cognitive architecture. The figure schematically describes
the various steps and aspects of the modeling procedure. Starting from IoP and teh definition
of the multi-layer social sensing framework of services and weighted weighted social multi-
plex network of users (first block), we quantify the evolutionary dynamics of human sensing
cooperation through game-theoretic modeling (second block). Then, after quantifying the
emergence and sustainability of cooperation on various network topologies and by varying
homophily between nodes on the network, we define the core of a DSS aiming at designing
socially-aware incentive mechanisms (see text).
3. Social Game Theory
The modeling approach is schematically described in Fig. 1. In the first
block, starting from IoP we derive the multi-layer social sensing platform, where
layers represent the various services but, at the same time, we define also the
weighted multiplex social sensing between users, where weighted relationships
are those among users and layers are the various channel of social interaction.
The second block is the game-theoretic modeling where, starting from weighted
social multiplex network, we explore social interactions between users and model
the evolutionary dynamics of human sensing behaviours. We quantify the emer-
gence and sustainability of cooperation by varying the network topologies, ho-
mophily and multiplexity. Once detected the games and network topologies
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leading to the emergence and sustainability of cooperation, we analytically de-
fine and measure the QoI and the users’ reputation scores in the network. Thus,
based on these measure, we define the core of a DSS targeted at designing proper
socially-aware and dynamic incentive mechanisms. In this section we describe
each block of the framework.
3.1. Multi-layer Social Sensing and Homophily
Let us consider a multiplex network of M layers, α = {1, ...,M}, and N
nodes, i = {1, ..., N}, which is a set of M networks Gα = (V,Eα). The set of
nodes V is the same for each layer, whereas the set of links E changes according
to the layer. Each entity or node in the weighted multiplex social sensing net-
work is a human user with a different contribution profile and interacting with
other users. Fig. 2 describes the multi-layer social sensing modeling approach
adopted in this work.
Service 1
Service 2
Service 3
ω1,2
Aggregated
(a) (b)
ωβγ
ωαβ
ω1,3
ω2,3
- Correlation/Regression
- Centrality
- Clustering
- Node, Layer and 
communities properties
- EGT
- Payoffs
- Evolution of Cooperation
- Multiplexity
- Inter-layer coupling and 
communicability
Classical Dynamical Processes
… …β
γ
α
𝒕𝒙
𝒕𝒙 − 𝟏
…
…
…
…
…
𝒕𝒙 − 𝟏
𝒕𝒙 − 𝟏 𝒕𝒙 + 𝟏
𝒕𝒙 + 𝟏
𝒕𝒙 + 𝟏
…
Figure 2: Multi-layer Social Sensing and inter-layer coupling on a Weighted Mul-
tiplex Social Sensing. The figure shows the multi-layer social sensing framework, where
layers correspond to different services (see (a)). We show our concept of aggregated net-
work, not only seen classically as including all the aggregated information about node, layer
and community properties, but in our model we also include the dynamical aspects, given
by evolutionary social dynamics, multiplexity and inter-layer coupling (see (a)). ωxy is the
inter-layer strength between two generic layers x and y, respectively corresponding to services
(a) and social networks (b) (where layers are denoted by α, β, and γ). In (b) we illustrate the
importance of considering the dynamical patterns of connectivity deriving from the weighted
multiplex social network. A perturbation in one layer could drive temporal changes in the
other layers through inter-layer coupling between layers in the multiplex structure (see Text).
In a MCS environment, layers represent various services exploited by the
users, and the multi-layer interactions may affect users’ sensing behaviour, and
their choice to actively and qualitatively contribute (i.e., cooperate) to the
sensing process. Thus, the proposed MCS multi-layer modeling approach is
dual: since it is both an IoP-based weighted multiplex social sensing, in terms of
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weighted interactions between users, and a multi-layer social sensing platform,
in terms of services (see Fig. 2). Indeed, users, while providing and sharing
information on various services (see Fig. 2 (a)), interact on the social multiplex
network changing their behaviour towards other users in the network and the
whole MCS application (see Fig. 2 (b)), thus impacting on the reliability and
operation of various services. The aggregated layer conveys all the structural
information contained in the multi-layer social sensing. In Fig. 2 (b) we show
the importance of considering the dynamic patterns of connectivity deriving
from the coupling between layers of the social multiplex network. Multiplex
networks inherently include the concept of heterogeneity [14, 29], both struc-
turally, in terms of various types of interactions on multiple layers, as well as in
terms of contributors’ profiles, that is the different behaviours in all the layers
of the multiplex structure. To characterize and measure such heterogeneity, we
define a weight for links between nodes at each layer, so that we consider a
weighted multiplex social network, where human behaviours are the result of
multi-scale social interactions on such networks [13, 12]. Weights’ definition is
based on a combined measure of eigenvector-like centrality and homophily, as
defined in [11]. The eigenvector-like centrality measure includes the concept of
influence in our analysis. Its definition is based on the spectral properties of the
adjacency matrix of each layer of the multiplex network. It allows us to take
into account not only the number of links of each node, but also the quality
of such connections. Central nodes are the most influential nodes which can
influence the behaviours of their neighbouring nodes.
In our model, other than considering a structural property of network rep-
resented by centrality, weights of interactions between human users at each
layer of the multiplex structure are defined according to the homophily measure
hij . In particular, homophily has a dual definition. On the one hand, it is an
interaction-based measure, depending on the frequency of interactions between
users on various social channels of interactions in the weighted multiplex social
sensing. Thus, the more they interact on the social multiplex network, the higher
will be the homophily measure between them. On the other hand, it is also a
similarity-based measure, which takes into account the different dimensions of
homophily, along with the actions on MCS services, to derive an Euclidean dis-
tance between human users. Overall, by considering both the definitions, we
can define the concept of homophily as follows:
Definition 3.1. Homophily, denoted as hij , is a measure of similarity between
two nodes/human users i and j, so that:
hij =
1
1 + δij
(1)
where δij is the homophily difference (or distance) between users i and j [11].
3.2. Game-Theoretic Modeling - Social Dilemmas and Network Structures
In order to quantify and capture the social dynamics of human users’ be-
haviours on the social multiplex network, we introduce an evolutionary game-
theoretic (EGT) approach. This allows us to obtain a multi-scale analysis of
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social dynamics and derive the impact of multiplexity on the users’ sensing at-
titude in MCS applications. In particular, we focus on exploring the evolution
of cooperation, intended as the emergence and sustainability or resilience of
cooperation on the multiplex network.
In the analysis of human sensing cooperation through EGT, we exploit dif-
ferent social dilemmas where, although these are all two-strategies games, each
of them has a different characterisation, reflected by the specific payoff matrix
representing its rules of interactions. Hence, social dilemmas allow us to analyse
different conflict situations and evaluate how each of them yields distinct Nash
equilibria and significant changes in game dynamics. It is important to observe
how a social dilemma is a game which possesses at least one socially inefficient
Nash equilibrium. In particular, we consider the iterated forms of the Prison-
ers Dilemma game (PD), the Snowdrift Game (SD), the Stag-Hunt game (SH)
and the Harmony Game (HG). In these social dilemmas, agents/players are the
users of a MCS system that, can choose between two strategies: cooperate (C)
or defect (D). Cooperating means honestly contributing and participating to
the sensing task, such that human user decides to pay a cost of providing his
contribution. In order to have a high operational reliability in a crowdsensing
application and have a robust Quality of Information (QoI), also the other player
should contribute. However, there could be users who decide to defect, such as
not paying any cost of contribution for accomplishing the task, or relying on
the contributions of others in a selfish way. In this case, if also the other player
decides to defect, the task will not be accomplished with a negative effect for
both players. A game can be defined in function of its payoff matrix as in Table
1. Players will both receive a reward R in the case of mutual cooperation or a
C D
C R S
D T P
Table 1: Generic payoff matrix. We show the generic payoff matrix of a social dilemma,
where R, S, T and P are respectively the Reward, Sucker, Temptation and Punishment payoffs
(see Text).
punishment P in the case of mutual defection. A defector will get the tempta-
tion payoff T when playing against a cooperator, while the cooperator obtains
the so-called sucker payoff S. The difference between the above defined social
dilemmas lies in the ranking of payoffs. In the PD, the payoffs are ordered as
T > R > P > S, meaning that the defection is the best strategy irrespective of
the opponents decision [21]. SD is an anti-coordination game where the payoffs’
ranking is the following: T > R > S > P , so that it evolves towards the coex-
istence of both cooperators and defectors. Instead, SH is a classical example of
coordination game and the ranking is as follows: R > T > P > S. Finally, in
the HG the ranking is: R > S > P and R > T > P . Overall, the final state
of a population playing the HG game will be total cooperation, regardless of
the initial fraction of cooperators, the opposite of PD. Moreover, each of the
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layers of the social multiplex network is a complex network that is represented
by a underlying graph where nodes are connected according to a network topol-
ogy [30]. Among them we consider the most investigated network topologies
or structures: random graphs network models, such as the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER)
model [31], the small-world (SW) networks, such as the Watts-Strogatz model
[32], and the Scale-free (SF) networks [33]. We therefore take into account
network structures exhibiting a different level of heterogeneity. ER graphs are
homogeneous networks, where nodes have the same degree, so that there is a
uniform probability to be connected (no degree correlations between nodes in
the network) and the degree distribution could be approximated by using the
Poisson distribution. SW networks are small heterogeneous networks, charac-
terised by a high clustering and modularity, so that there are groups of nodes
that are more highly connected than the rest of the network, and there is an over-
abundance of hubs (high-degree nodes) that mediate the shortest path length.
In SW networks, degree distributions exhibit a fast typically Gaussian decaying
tail. Finally, SF networks are highly heterogeneous networks, characterised by a
power-law degree distribution. They exhibit a high degree correlation between
nodes and degree distribution has a long tail, which means that there are a few
hubs in the network.
3.2.1. Evolutionary Dynamics of Human Sensing Behaviours
To explore and quantify the evolutionary dynamics of human sensing be-
haviours on the social multiplex network, we take into account the iterated
forms of the above-described pairwise social dilemmas (see 3.2, where at each
round of the game human users can change their strategies or behaviours, based
on imitation dynamics of the fittest strategies [11, 17]. We quantify and sim-
ulate the evolutionary process in accordance with the standard Monte Carlo
simulation procedure, composed of elementary steps, as in [11, 17, 34], so that
at each round a player i changes its strategy Si and adopts the strategy Sj from
player j with a probability determined by the Fermi function, defined as follows
[11]:
W (Sj → Si) = (ηi) · 1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/(δij ·K)] (2)
Therefore, a player i adopts the strategy Sj of another player j in function of
the payoff difference Pi−Pj , and according to δij and ηi values. Specifically, δij
is the homophily difference between two human users, so that if this value is low,
a player i is more likely to imitate the strategy of j at each round (see 3.2.2). K
is the selection intensity and quantifies the uncertainty in the strategy adoption
process and it is defined as in [11]. ηi is the scaling factor defined according to
the communicability function between layers of the multiplex structure [11, 22].
It is introduced to include the dependency of the strategy adopted by the player
i on the strategies adopted by the counterpart nodes and its neighbours on the
other layers [11]. Thus, ηi points out the coupling between layers (ωxy) in the
investigation of the evolution of human sensing behaviours on the multiplex
structure and it may result in a bias regarding the strategy adoption of the
11
player i in the subsequent round of the game. Specifically, the scaling factor ηi,
is defined as follows:
ηi = 1− (ηimax − ηimin)
∑
j∈β,Sj=Si [Gαβ ]ij∑
j∈β [Gαβ ]ij
, (3)
where at the numerator there is the sum of the communicability functions cal-
culated between the node i on the layer α and all its neighbouring nodes j on
the layer β, adopting the same strategy as player i. The denominator represents
the sum of the communicability functions calculated between the node i on the
layer α and all its neighbouring nodes j on the layer β.
3.2.2. Communicability function
Overall, the factor ηi enables us to measure the effect of inter-layer coupling
and influence between a node/player and its replica on the other layers. Thus,
we leverage the definition of communicability function provided in [22], which
quantifies the number of possible routes that two nodes i and j in the multi-
plex have to communicate with each other. Therefore, considering a multiplex
network consisting of M layers, denoted by L1, L2, ..., LM , and their respective
matrices Z1, Z2, ..., ZM , representing the Hadamard product between the ho-
mophily matrices and the adjacency matrices of the multiplex M, its matrix is
then given by: M = ZL + CLL, where ZL is defined as follows:
ZL = ⊕Ma=1Zα (4)
and CLL is a matrix describing the inter-layer interaction, defined as follows:
CLL =

0 C12 ... C1M
C21 0 ... C2M
...
...
. . .
...
CM1 CM2 ... 0
 ∈ RNM×NM (5)
where each element Cαβ ∈ RN×N represents the interaction of layer α with layer
β. Here it is assumed that we have a symmetric interaction between layers, that
is: Cαβ = Cβα = C = ωαβI = ωβαI, for all layers α and β. ω is the parameter
describing the strength of the inter-layer interaction, and I ∈ RN×N is the
corresponding identity matrix. So we can now write the multiplex matrix as
follows:
M =

Z1 ω12I ... ω1MI
ω21I Z2 ... ω2MI
...
...
. . .
...
ωM1I ωM2I ... ZM
 ∈ RNM×NM (6)
As we are interested in accounting for all the walks between any pair of nodes
in the multiplex, we take into account the number of walks of length k between
two generic nodes i and j in the multiplex, which is given by the α, β-entry of
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the K-th power of the adjacency matrix of the network. Hence, the walks of k
length in the multiplex are given by the different entries of MK . These walks
can include both intra- and inter-layer hops [22] and we are interested in giving
more weight to the shortest walks than to the longer ones.
The communicability between two nodes i and j in the multiplex network is
defined as the weighted sum of all walks from i to j as follows:
Gij = I +M+
M2
2!
+ ... =
∞∑
k=0
Mk
k!
= [exp(ZL + CLL)]ij (7)
We can now define the communicability matrix G, where each element Gαβ ∈
RN×N is the matrix representing the communicability between each pair of
nodes belonging to two different layers α and β, of the multiplex M. It is
defined as follows:
G = exp(ZL + CLL) =

G11 G12 ... G1M
G21 G22 ... G2M
...
...
. . .
...
GM1 GM2 ... GMM
 (8)
where G ∈ RNM×NM and [Gαβ ]ij represents the communicability between
the node i on the layer α and the node j on the layer β.
3.3. Statistical Measures for Designing Incentive Mechanisms - QoI and User
Reputation Score
In order to design a novel incentive mechanism, we need to define some
statistical estimators related to users’ behaviour. Thus, starting from the quan-
tification of human users’ behaviour, we introduce a novel measure of reputation
score based on human users’ behaviours in the multi-layer social sensing. The
reputation score for each individual is calculated as a function of the quality
and quantity of data provided by the individual [1]. In order to define the user
reputation score for each human user, first we quantify the ‘social honesty’ of
each individual, by defining the statistical estimator γi as follows:
γi =
∑
i
(NC)i/(Nr ∗Nnb), (9)
where NCi is the number of cooperative behaviours of node i over the Nr
rounds of the game. Nnb is the number of neighbours for each node i. Thus, γi
quantifies the level of cooperativeness of each user in the network, considering its
behaviour against neighbourhood and it allows us to classify the contributors in
honest, selfish or malicious users [1, 15]. Here γi ranges in [0, 1] such that γi = 0
reflects a lack of cooperativeness, while γi = 1 means that a human user has
been fully cooperative with a proactive attitude towards its social community
and neighbourhood. By averaging this measure over the population, we get an
overall measure of QoI in the network structure, defined as follows:
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QoI = γavi = (1/N) ∗
∑
i
γi (10)
The user reputation scores RSi for each user i are given by the ratio between
the local measure of γi for each node averaged over the global attitude of users
in the network, given by the QoI measure, so that it is defined as follows:
RSi = γi/γ
av
i = γi/QoI (11)
The statistical estimator RSi quantifies and relates the importance of the con-
tribution given by the user as compared with the overall QoI in the network.
Table 2 sums up all the statistical estimators and parameters defined in our
model.
Estimator Physical meaning/Definition
hij Homophily between nodes i and j
δij Homophily difference (distance) between nodes i and j
ηi Scaling factor depending on the communicability function
Pi Payoff obtained by the player i
Pj Payoff obtained by the player j
Si Strategy chosen by the player i
Sj Strategy chosen by the player j
γi Social honesty of the player i
QoI Quality of Information
RSi Reputation Score for each user i
Table 2: Statistical estimators of the model. We include the definition and physical
meaning of the different statistical estimators/parameters of the model (see Text).
4. Results
In our model, we aim at evaluating and quantifying the role of homophily,
network heterogeneity and multiplexity in the emergence and sustainability of
cooperation on the social multiplex network of human users. Thus, the first
target is to derive the density of cooperators at steady-state in the network. To
this aim, simulations have been conducted choosing a social multiplex network
with M layers (where the number of layers has been varied) and N = 200 nodes
or human users, where each layer is modeled as one of the network structures.
Homophily values are randomly chosen following a normal distribution around
a mean value, with standard deviation σ. The target has been to analyse the
joint effect of all these aspects in the evolutionary dynamics, detecting those
configurations of network structures and social dilemmas more able to make the
cooperation among human users propagate and sustain in the network.
4.1. Density of cooperators
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of cooperation, namely the density of coopera-
tive nodes against the rounds of the game. We have simulated the evolution-
ary dynamics in all the possible configurations of social dilemmas and network
14
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Figure 3: Density plots. The figure illustrates the density of cooperation in various network
configurations and social dilemmas (a-h). The colour corresponds to the density ρ, ranging
from ‘blue’ (lowest) to ‘red’ (highest). We show the following configurations of network struc-
ture and game: (a) SF-HG; (b) SF-PD; (c) SF-SH; (d) SW-SH; (e) SW-PD; (f) ER-PD; (g)
ER-SD with M = 2 layers; (h) ER-SD with M = 7 layers.
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topologies, also varying the number of layers, for a number of rounds such that
a dynamical steady-state was reached.We can observe how the SF is the most
suitable network topology for the emergence of cooperation (see (a)-(b)-(c)).
Instead, both in the ER and SW networks, there is a mixed equilibrium with
a coexistence of both strategies. More specifically, in the SW network topol-
ogy, in both cases of SH and PD, we can see the coexistence of both strategies
with a prevalence of defectors at equilibrium (see (d)-(e)). The emergence of
defection is more marked in the PD rather than in SH, as expected considering
the defecting nature of PD. While in the ER network configuration, when PD
is played between human users, at the beginning we can observe the prevalence
of defectors and a coexistence of the two strategies at equilibrium (see (f)). Fi-
nally, the last two plots related to ER network and SD (see (g)-(h)) allows us
to highlight the role of the number of layers in the evolutionary dynamics of
behaviours. In particular, as in [21, 16], an increase in the number of layers
results in a stronger emergence of cooperation on the social multiplex network,
as indicated by the higher density of ‘red’ points at equilibrium.
This result is what we expected by reasoning in terms of connectivity pat-
terns of the different structures and it is related to the nature of the SF network
topology compared with ER and SW networks. Indeed, SF is inherently hetero-
geneous, strictly resembling real-world networks displaying a skewed statistical
distribution deriving from the preferential attachment rule (“rich-get-richer”)
[33]. The evolutionary dynamics observed in the case of SW structure derives
from its high clustering coefficient of a node with its neighbours, thus bordering
the cooperation within communities.
Comparing the two SF cases (a) and (b), we clearly observe the difference
related to the game played by users, where HG produces a higher density of co-
operation than in the SH, as expected from literature [21]. Thus in the SF case,
although in all social dilemmas we can notice the emergence of cooperation,
HG and SD are the most cooperative dilemmas at evolutionary equilibrium and
those more able to sustain cooperation over time. This is even more marked in
the high homophily case (σ = 1), where we note a faster emergence of coopera-
tion, rather than in the low homophily case (σ = 8), as expected from [11, 17].
4.2. Colour maps
By digging deep into the impact of games along with the various network
topologies, in Fig. 4 we show the density of cooperators in the T-S plane, where
each of the quadrants correspond to a different social dilemma. Generally, T-
S plane allows us to show and better understand what happens in terms of
evolutionary dynamics by varying the values of temptation and sucker’s payoffs
of the different social dilemmas. Furthermore, it allows us to visualize and bring
out the transitions areas between the different density levels of cooperation for
each network structure and game. In (a) and (b) we show the most cooperative
topology, namely the SF, in both cases of low and high homophily. Despite the
different dynamics observed for the different games, in the high homophily case
there is a major density of cooperators rather than the low homophily case.
Below we discuss the results for each quadrant of the colour maps.
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(a) SF (low homophily)
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Figure 4: Colour maps. The figure shows the density of cooperators in the T-S plane, which
is divided into four quadrants representing the various social dilemmas: HG (upper-left), SD
(upper-right), SH (lower-left), and PD (lower-right). The colour corresponds to the density
ρ, ranging from ‘white’ (lowest) to ‘red’ (highest) (see colour bar on the right of each colour
map).
The HG (upper-left quadrant), where cooperation is its dominant strategy,
results the most cooperative game, since we see the higher emergence and re-
silience of cooperation compared with the other dilemmas, even when choosing
high values of temptation payoff (b). The SD (upper-right quadrant) is an anti-
coordination game characterised by a stable equilibrium in mixed populations.
Thus, we observe the coexistence of both strategies at equilibrium, also varying
the values of temptation and sucker’s payoffs. In this game the role played by
homophily is more evident, since by increasing homophily we see a higher den-
sity of cooperation in the T-S plane. In the SH (lower-left quadrant), there is an
unstable evolutionary equilibrium with mixed populations. As in the SD case,
we have the coexistence of both strategies, even if the density of cooperation is
on average lower than SD. Analogously to SD, we can see the increase of den-
sity of cooperative nodes according to homophily values. In the PD (lower-right
quadrant), defection dominates cooperation, but by comparing the PD in the
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two cases of low and high homophily, we can see how homophily allows cooper-
ation to emerge. This is more clear for low values of b (e. g., b = 1), which is
equal to the temptation payoff in the PD, and for values of c that tend towards
zero. In the case of PD, an increase of temptation (b) and a decrease of sucker’s
payoff values (since, by increasing c values, we have lower sucker’s payoffs, which
is equal to −c, which means a major cost of cooperating), yield an increasingly
lower density of cooperators (see the lower-left corner of the PD quadrant). In
(c) and (d) we show the density of cooperators in the ER and SW networks.
By looking at the density of cooperation in the T-S plane resulting from both
these network structures, the previously discussed inherent properties of each
game are even more marked than in SF network. Indeed, from one hand we can
easily see the high cooperativeness of HG (upper-left quadrant) and vice versa
the high density of defecting users in the PD (lower-right quadrant). On the
other hand, we can observe how in both SD and SH, we have the coexistence of
mixed strategies.
4.3. The role of Network Heterogeneity
Our results shed light on the importance of network heterogeneity, as it in-
duces cooperative agents (or nodes) to create assortative clusters, where they
reciprocate cooperation. This mechanism is known as network reciprocity, and
it represents one of the five mechanisms ruling the cooperation between indi-
viduals [35, 36]. The main underlying principle is that the benefit produced
by cooperating outweighs the cost of cooperating with all neighbours. In par-
ticular, by denoting with r the benefit-to-cost ratio (or game return), so that:
r = b/c, we have that the fixation of cooperation through network reciprocity
occurs only if it is satisfied the following condition: r = b/c > 〈k〉, where 〈k〉
is the average degree in the network (the average number of neighbours). The
average degree: 〈k〉 = 1N
∑N
i=1(ki) gives information about the network spar-
sity, but it does not provide any information on the degree distribution, which is
instead the discriminant of each network topology. For this reason, it is crucial
to dig deep into the microscopic and mesoscopic issues of cooperation, better
explaining how the cooperation evolves [19]. There are mainly three types of
players: mixed players (players that change their strategy as the evolutionary
process runs), pure defectors and pure cooperators (players that never change
their strategy). The organisation of these players is worthy because always ex-
ists a boundary of mixed players between pure cooperators and pure defectors.
At the mesoscopic level, the community structure of the network typical of many
real social networks, has been demonstrated to be important in the preserva-
tion of cooperation under heavy temptation to defect conditions. Reasoning in
microscopic terms, as also underlined in [18], the stability of cooperation in the
network structure depends on being more in contact with nodes having different
and fluctuating strategies and not with the clusters of defectors. The cluster of
cooperators is stable if none of its composing nodes has a defector neighbour
coupled to more than NC/b cooperators, where NC is the number of coopera-
tors linked to the player. This becomes even more challenging for cooperation
to evolve if these connections between a cooperator and a defector neighbour
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occurs with a high homophily between that nodes. The main difference between
the considered network structures in microscopic terms is related to the distribu-
tion and composition of the clusters of cooperators and defectors. Indeed, in the
case of ER graphs, looking at Figs. 3 and 4 there is a wide region of temptation
payoffs with a coexistence of the two strategies, and this is due to the presence
of several small clusters of cooperators. This fragmentation of pure cooperators
into several clusters of cooperators merged into a region of fluctuating individ-
uals, makes these clusters more exposed to invasion. Instead, in SF networks
pure cooperators form more compact clusters, that follow hubs behaviours, and
finally merging them in a big group or main cluster. The formation over the
rounds of games of only one big group of cooperators makes them more resilient
to defection as the number of pure cooperators exposed to fluctuating individ-
uals is lower. High homophily values further speed up the process of group (or
cluster) formation and also the size of the single cooperative group in the SF
network [11], enhancing the network resilience against an invasion of defectors.
In SW networks, there is also a continuous formation of compact clusters of co-
operators, due to the high clustering coefficient of SW network. However, these
clusters in the network hinder the evolution of cooperation and its fixation in
the whole multiplex structure due to the lack of weak ties between groups or
cluster of cooperators. Thus, cooperative behaviours remain bounded within
clusters, since cooperators in the clusters are less connected to the surrounding
network, reducing the probability for a widespread propagation. This is due
to the inherent nature of SW networks, having only a small heterogeneity and
not highly connected hubs. Moreover, it is important to note how the results
in terms of evolutionary dynamics of behaviours for the different games are co-
herent with those obtained in [21, 16, 11]. In addition, we have analysed and
quantified the impact of different network topologies (SF, ER, SW) and the role
of homophily, shedding light on its impact on the evolution of cooperation in
the various social dilemmas. Results confirm how homophily acts as a shap-
ing factor of cooperation, able to increase the density of cooperation in all the
evolutionary games [11, 17].
4.4. Local and global Nash equilibrium points - Homophily and Heterogeneity
Starting from the previous considerations, related to the various games, net-
work heterogeneity and homophily, in this section, following [37], we define
local and Nash equilibria points in our model. Nash equilibrium represents a
key concept in game theory, as it suggests the possible outcomes when different
players play simultaneously in order to maximise their payoff. The idea behind
equilibrium is that if the players choose strategies that are best responses to
each other, then no player has an incentive to deviate to an alternative strategy
[38]. In evolutionary settings (EGT), the concept of Nash equilibrium consists
of the Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Thus, the equilibrium is a stable
distribution of strategies, namely a genetically-determined strategy that tends
to persist once it is prevalent in a population [38].
In the case of structured population, such as a social multiplex network,
interactions are spatially constrained, as nodes and their counterparts interact
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only with their neighbours at various layers of the multiplex structure. At each
round a node/player plays with only one neighbour as described in section 3.
In our model, links are relatively stable in the whole evolution process, but we
change homophily values in order to quantify its impact on different network
topologies and games. As showed in density plots (see Fig. 3) and contour plots
(see Fig. 4), we observe how the stable states are only three, respectively corre-
sponding to a prevalence of defectors, cooperators and mixed strategies. These
stable states are the result of a chain of local Nash equilibria [37], until reaching
a global equilibrium. Indeed, the overall population is divided into a few groups
playing the same strategy, and the various factors, such as network heterogene-
ity and specifically homophily, impact on the formation of these groups over the
time, both in terms of speed and size [11], as underlined in the previous sections.
The higher are the homophily values, the quicker is the formation and size of
groups of cooperators, in all the games and specifically their role is more evident
in PD and SD games. In other words, we can observe the presence of attractors
and a polarisation of strategies mainly focused on defectors and cooperators.
Homophily plays a key role in making cooperation percolate through the net-
work, and this is even more marked in a SF network, due to its heterogeneity
in the degree distribution as explained in section 4.3.
Since deriving the exact expressions of ESS or Nash equilibria points is
extremely difficult due to the difficulty of formulating the replicator dynamics,
following [37], we define local Nash equilibria. Then, in order to get the ESS, a
chain of local Nash equilibria is suffice to lead the system into the stable state,
since in structured population and heterogeneous networks balancing the gap
of payoffs between different strategies is not so difficult.
We are going to discuss and define the local Nash equilibrium in structured
populations, exploiting the model presented in [37], and extending their defini-
tion including homophily and therefore replacing the adjacency matrix Aij with
the matrix ZL as in (4).
At each round of the game, a node/player i, plays with its neighbours whose
number is quantified by the degree centrality ki. In a two-strategy evolutionary
game, we can define the strategy of the player i as follows:
Θi(n) =
(
Si(n)
1− Si(n)
)
(12)
where Si(n) can only take values 1 or 0 at the n-th round. For Si(n) = 1,
the player i is a cooperator (C), while for Si(n) = 1, player i is a defector (D).
Locally, for each player i’s gaming environment, we define the local frequency
of cooperators at the nth round as follows:
Ξi(n) =
∑
j ZijΘ
T
j (n)
(
1
0
)
ki
(13)
In this scenario, keeping the strategies of the neighbours of the player i
unchanged is equivalent to keeping Ξi(n) unchanged. For the global gaming
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environment, we define the global frequency (or density) of cooperators at the
nth round as follows:
ρ(n) =
∑
i Θ
T
i (n)
(
1
0
)
N
(14)
where N denotes the population or the number of nodes of the social mul-
tiplex network.
In a two-player game, the payoff table is a 2 × 2 matrix as in Table 1.
Considering equation (12), the payoff of player i at the nth round is given by:
Pi(n) = Θ
T
i (n)
(
R S
T P
)∑
j
ZijΘj(n) (15)
Given eq. (15),
∑
j ZijΘj(n) can be rewritten as:∑
j
ZijΘj(n) = ki
((
1
0
)
Ξi(n) +
(
0
1
)
(1− Ξi(n))
)
(16)
By including the eq. (12) and eq. (16) into eq. (15), we obtain:
Φi(n) = ki(∆i(n)Si(n) + TΞi(n) + P (1− Ξi(n))) (17)
where ki denotes the connectivity of node i and ∆i(n) = S − P + (R −
T + P − S)Ξi(n). The maximum of Φi(n) is obtained by considering the best
strategy, which is denoted by [37]:
Si,max(n) =

1 , for ∆i(n) > 0
1 or 0 , for ∆i(n) = 0
0 , for ∆i(n) < 0
(18)
If two connected nodes i and j choose strategies Si,max(n) and Sj,max(n) as
their strategies at the nth round, respectively, they are in a local Nash Equilib-
rium. These two nodes/players are called as “Nash pair”. Then, if all the nodes
in the multiplex structure are in the local Nash Equilibrium, the population is
in a global Nash Equilibrium. If ∆i(n) = 0 or ∆j(n) = 0, this local equilib-
rium represents a weak local Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, it is a strict local
Nash equilibrium. The maximum evaluated in the previous equation depends
on the value of ∆i(n), that is defined starting from the payoff matrix values.
In our model, along with payoffs, also homophily values impact on the strategy
adoption through the matrix Zij matrix. Moreover, local Nash equilibria rep-
resent a series of multiple equilibria, whose emergence is ruled by the various
factors defined in the model. Each of these local Nash equilibria behaves as an
agent, and then reaching a sort of coalescence corresponding to the global Nash
equilibrium.
Starting from [37], we redefine a “Nash pair”, which measures the fraction
(or density) of Nash pairs in the overall multiplex network, as follows:
α =
Np
E
(19)
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Figure 5: Local and global Nash equilibria. In the case of SF network and PD game,
figure shows the different phase transitions representing the local Nash equilibria and finally
the global Nash equilibrium represented by the overall cooperation in the multiplex structure
(see Text).
where Np denotes the number of the Nash pairs in a network and E denotes
the number of edges through the layers of the network. It is important to note
that if two nodes have multiple links on the various layers of the multiplex
network, in the aggregated network we only consider this connection once. If
ki = kj = 1, the local Nash equilibrium is equal to Nash equilibrium in the
classical game theory. As underlined in [37], the parameter α constitutes a tool
to evaluate the evolutionary dynamics of behaviours in the multiplex structure
is in an evolutionary stable state.
Local Nash equilibria in the structured population are metastable points
where sub-populations and groups move towards a stable global equilibrium
state over time. This ESS corresponds to the overall cooperation, and its emer-
gence is based on network heterogeneity, the type of game considered and ho-
mophily values. The system shows a low multiplicity, a few number of steady
states and the variously the different factors allows to reach these states. Even
though we do not have data to derive the exact trajectory towards the global
equilibrium, we observe both analytically and by simulations how an highly
heterogeneous network, such as SF [39], allow the cooperation to emerge in the
social multiplex network. Furthermore, high homophily values lead more quickly
to local Nash equilibria and then the global Nash equilibrium, by speeding up
the formation of groups of cooperators, increasing their size and enhancing the
network resilience against an invasion of defectors [11].
Fig. 5 shows how the density α of Nash pairs varies over the time, considering
high homophily values and a SF as network substrate. We can observe phase
transitions with the emergence of local metastable Nash equilibria, and finally
the global Nash equilibrium given by the overall cooperation.
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4.5. User Reputation Score in a MCS scenario
We have simulated a simple scenario of vehicular crowdsensing applications
(services) using synthetic generated following an approach similar to that in [1].
We have considered synthetic data of a simple scenario of a vehicular crowdsens-
ing application, but our modeling approach is generic and may be extended to
any kind of MCS service. We formulate the MCS in vehicular networks and the
interactions between human users/vehicles equipped with sensors as a vehicular
crowdsensing game. Each of them participates to the sensing task and chooses
its strategy based on some constraints related to sensing costs/risks and gains
derived from the accomplishment of the sensing task. As discussed earlier, we
consider both the quantity (degree of participation) and quality (accuracy of
contributions) of the reported events [15, 1]. They represent the contributors’
profiles and have been used as input data. Then, following the proposed game-
theoretic modeling approach, we have measured the user reputation scores for
each human node in the different configurations of network structure and social
dilemmas. By looking at Fig. 6, we can observe how in the SF case, user repu-
tation scores assume high values distributed between 0.85 and 1.0, significantly
higher than in the ER and SW cases. Indeed, in the ER and SW cases scores
are mainly distributed in the range between 0 and 0.4. We can also observe how
the SW network behaves worse than ER in terms of user reputation scores.
5. Conclusions
In MCS application scenarios, based on participatory sensing, human be-
haviours assume increasingly a crucial role in the operational reliability of the
MCS services. Incentive mechanisms are therefore designed to motivate users to
contribute focusing both on the quality and quantity of contributions [1]. In this
work, we have proposed a methodology which represents the core of a Decision
Support System (DSS) for designing incentive mechanisms, extracting the rules
and human-centric policies or metrics to disburse incentives to human users.
Other than simultaneously participate to various services, they are social nodes
that interact each other on a weighted social multiplex network, where each
layer corresponds to a distinct type of relation among them and weight of each
connection depends on homophily between nodes. We have analysed such inter-
actions and quantified the role of homophily, network heterogeneity and multiple
interactions in shaping human sensing behaviours on a networked scenario. We
have therefore defined a game-theoretic modeling approach which allows us to
get a multi-scale integration of all these issues, quantifying the emergence and
resilience of cooperation on the weighted social multiplex network. In this way,
it has been possible to detect which configurations of both social dilemmas and
network structure bring out the emergence and sustainability of cooperation.
Then, by considering a simple scenario of MCS and synthetic data related to a
vehicular crowdsensing scenario as input data of our model, we have measured
the user reputation scores in a synthetic social multiplex network, based on the
configurations detected in the previous evolutionary dynamics. Findings have
confirmed how user reputation scores are higher for those configurations more
able to make cooperation emerge and sustain in the network. We have therefore
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Figure 6: User Reputation scores. The figure shows the user reputation scores (y-axis)
against nodes (x-axis) (a) in two configurations of network structure and social dilemmas, and
(b) a comparison between the user reputation scores deriving from different network structures
considering the same social dilemma (PD) (see Text).
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Figure 7: Game-theoretic modeling for designing incentive mechanisms in MCS.
The figure shows a conceptual description of the proposed methodology, which has been also
implemented in the software. Starting from the dynamic patterns of connectivity on a multi-
layer social sensing framework, which includes homophily, network heterogeneity (network
structures in the block correspond to ER, SF and SW networks), the game-theoretic modeling
leads us to quantify the truthfulness measures, and define the core of a DSS for designing
incentive mechanisms.
proposed to include also social dynamics, multiplexity and human-related issues
in the design of socially-aware and human-centric incentive mechanisms.
In Fig. 7 we conceptually map the various aspects of the proposed method-
ology onto the MCS space. Starting from the dynamic patterns of connectivity,
the multi-layer social sensing framework, which includes homophily, network
heterogeneity and multiplex structure measures, and the game-theoretic mod-
eling guides choices according to human sensing behaviours. It leads to evalu-
ate and quantify the human-centric policies, defining a MCS space that allows
us to quantify the truthfulness measures for designing incentive mechanisms.
We therefore get a Decision Support System (DSS) able to perform a decision
making process related to disbursing incentives to users based on dynamic and
human-centric policies. As in [40], these policies represent a minimised set of
rules extracted from both qualitative and quantitative information and data
related to human users and their behaviours. Thus, the DSS results from the
analysis and quantification through a game-theoretic modeling approach which
allows us to join and combine multiplexity, network heterogeneity and human-
related factors represented by homophily.
We envisage that the proposed methodology, enclosing social dynamics, mul-
tiplexity and human-related issues, may provide new insights in the future de-
sign of socially-aware and human-centric incentive mechanisms. Furthermore,
in the future work, the idea is to include a dynamic definition of weights and
payoffs related to micro-packets of energy exchanged between nodes, i.e., micro-
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affirmations and micro-inequities [34], to better understand the evolutionary
dynamics of the human sensing behaviours. Moreover, we aim at further vali-
dating the efficacy of the proposed methodological approach by exploiting real
data sets of various MCS scenarios, also including other environmental, social
and behavioural MCS applications.
Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by the Research Grant: Italian Ministry
of University and Research (MIUR) - PON REC 2014 - 2020 within the project
ARS01 01116 TALIsMAN.
References
[1] S. Bhattacharjee, N. Ghosh, V. K. Shah, S. K. Das, Qnq: Quality and
quantity based unified approach for secure and trustworthy mobile crowd-
sensing, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 19 (1) (2020) 200–216
(Jan 2020). doi:10.1109/TMC.2018.2889458.
[2] Y. Chen, H. Chen, S. Yang, X. Gao, Y. Guo, F. Wu, Designing incentive
mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing with intermediaries, Wireless Com-
munications and Mobile Computing (2019).
[3] X. Zhang, Z. Yang, W. Sun, Y. Liu, S. Tang, K. Xing, X. Mao, Incentives
for mobile crowd sensing: A survey, IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials 18 (1) (2015) 54–67 (2015).
[4] D. E. Boubiche, M. Imran, A. Maqsood, M. Shoaib, Mobile crowd sensing–
taxonomy, applications, challenges, and solutions, Computers in Human
Behavior (2018).
[5] H. Jin, L. Su, D. Chen, H. Guo, K. Nahrstedt, J. Xu, Thanos: Incentive
mechanism with quality awareness for mobile crowd sensing, IEEE Trans-
actions on Mobile Computing (2018).
[6] D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Fang, J. Tang, Incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing:
Crowdsourcing with smartphones, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(TON) 24 (3) (2016) 1732–1744 (2016).
[7] M. Conti, A. Passarella, S. K. Das, The internet of people (iop): A new
wave in pervasive mobile computing, Pervasive and Mobile Computing 41
(2017) 1–27 (2017).
[8] F. Restuccia, S. K. Das, J. Payton, Incentive mechanisms for participa-
tory sensing: Survey and research challenges, ACM Transactions on Sensor
Networks (TOSN) 12 (2) (2016) 13 (2016).
26
[9] F. Restuccia, P. Ferraro, S. Silvestri, S. K. Das, G. L. Re, Incentme: Ef-
fective mechanism design to stimulate crowdsensing participants with un-
certain mobility, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 18 (7) (2019)
1571–1584 (July 2019). doi:10.1109/TMC.2018.2863288.
[10] H. Gao, C. H. Liu, W. Wang, J. Zhao, Z. Song, X. Su, J. Crowcroft, K. K.
Leung, A survey of incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing, IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17 (2) (2015) 918–943 (2015).
[11] A. Di Stefano, M. Scata`, A. La Corte, P. Lio`, E. Catania, E. Guardo,
S. Pagano, Quantifying the role of homophily in human cooperation using
multiplex evolutionary game theory, PloS one 10 (10) (2015).
[12] F. Battiston, V. Nicosia, V. Latora, The new challenges of multiplex net-
works: Measures and models, The European Physical Journal Special Top-
ics 226 (3) (2017) 401–416 (2017).
[13] S. Boccaletti, G. Bianconi, R. Criado, D. G. C. I., J. Go´mez-Garden˜es,
M. Romance, I. Sendin˜a-Nadal, Z. Wang, M. Zanin, The structure and
dynamics of multilayer networks, Physics Reports 544 (1) (2014) 1–122
(2014).
[14] M. Scata`, A. Di Stefano, A. La Corte, P. Lio`, Quantifying the propagation
of distress and mental disorders in social networks, Scientific Reports 8 (1)
(2018) 5005 (2018).
[15] A. Di Stefano, M. Scata`, A. La Corte, S. K. Das, P. Lio`, Improving qoe
in multi-layer social sensing: A cognitive architecture and game theoretic
model, in: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Social
Sensing, ACM, 2019, pp. 18–23 (2019).
[16] J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, I. Reinares, A. Arenas, L. M. Flor´ıa, Evolution of
cooperation in multiplex networks, Scientific reports 2 (2012) 620 (2012).
[17] M. Scata`, A. Di Stefano, A. La Corte, P. Lio`, E. Catania, E. Guardo,
S. Pagano, Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to
analyze human cooperation patterns, Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 91 (2016)
17–24 (2016).
[18] F. C. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, T. Lenaerts, Evolutionary dynamics of so-
cial dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 103 (9) (2006) 3490–3494 (2006).
[19] J. Poncela, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, L. M. Flor´ıa, Y. Moreno, Robustness of
cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex networks,
New Journal of Physics 9 (6) (2007) 184 (2007).
[20] F. Dercole, F. Della Rossa, C. Piccardi, Direct reciprocity and model-
predictive rationality explain network reciprocity over social ties, Scientific
reports 9 (1) (2019) 5367 (2019).
27
[21] J. T. Matamalas, J. Poncela-Casasnovas, S. Go´mez, A. Arenas, Strate-
gical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex
networks, Scientific reports 5 (2015) 9519 (2015).
[22] E. Estrada, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, Communicability reveals a transition to
coordinated behavior in multiplex networks, Physical Review E 89 (4)
(2014) 042819 (2014).
[23] S. Iyer, T. Killingback, Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on
complex networks, PLoS computational biology 12 (2) (2016) e1004779
(2016).
[24] F. Restuccia, N. Ghosh, S. Bhattacharjee, S. K. Das, T. Melodia, Quality of
information in mobile crowdsensing: Survey and research challenges, ACM
Transactions on Sensor Networks 13 (4) (2017) 34 (2017).
[25] J. Nie, J. Luo, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, P. Wang, A stackelberg game approach
toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing, IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications 18 (1) (2019) 724–738 (2019).
[26] J. Nie, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, P. Wang, J. Luo, A socially-aware incentive
mechanism for mobile crowdsensing service market, in: 2018 IEEE Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–7 (2018).
[27] X. Gong, X. Chen, J. Zhang, H. V. Poor, Exploiting social trust assisted
reciprocity (star) toward utility-optimal socially-aware crowdsensing, IEEE
Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks 1 (3)
(2015) 195–208 (2015).
[28] L. Xiao, T. Chen, C. Xie, H. Dai, H. V. Poor, Mobile crowdsensing games
in vehicular networks, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 67 (2)
(2018) 1535–1545 (2018).
[29] M. Scata`, A. Di Stefano, P. Lio`, A. La Corte, The impact of heterogeneity
and awareness in modeling epidemic spreading on multiplex networks, Sci-
entific Reports 6 (37105) (2016) 1–13 (2016). doi:http://doi.org/10.
1038/srep37105.
[30] S. Boccaletti, V. Latora, Y. Moreno, M. Chavez, D.-U. Hwang, Complex
networks: Structure and dynamics, Physics reports 424 (4-5) (2006) 175–
308 (2006).
[31] P. Erdo¨s, A. Re´nyi, On random graphs, Publicationes Mathematicae (De-
brecen) 6 (1959) 290–297 (1959).
[32] D. J. Watts, S. H. Strogatz, Collective dynamics of small-worldnetworks,
nature 393 (6684) (1998) 440 (1998).
[33] A.-L. Baraba´si, R. Albert, Emergence of scaling in random networks, sci-
ence 286 (5439) (1999) 509–512 (1999).
28
[34] A. Di Stefano, M. Scata`, S. Vijayakumar, C. Angione, A. La Corte, P. Lio`,
Social dynamics modeling of chrono-nutrition, PLoS computational biology
15 (1) (2019) e1006714 (2019).
[35] M. A. Nowak, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation, science 314 (5805)
(2006) 1560–1563 (2006).
[36] M. A. Nowak, R. M. May, Evolutionary games and spatial chaos, Nature
359 (6398) (1992) 826 (1992).
[37] Y. Zhang, M. Aziz-Alaoui, C. Bertelle, J. Guan, Local nash equilibrium in
social networks, Scientific reports 4 (2014) 6224 (2014).
[38] D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, et al., Networks, crowds, and markets, Vol. 8,
Cambridge university press Cambridge, 2010 (2010).
[39] F. C. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, Scale-free networks provide a unifying frame-
work for the emergence of cooperation, Physical Review Letters 95 (9)
(2005) 098104 (2005).
[40] T. Muller, P. Lio, Personalisable clinical decision support system, ERCIM
NEWS (116) (2019) 19–20 (2019).
29
